イスラエル情勢 34

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200:名無し三等兵 (ﾜｯﾁｮｲ d975-FtXC [240f:46:9807:1:*])
 24/04/15 05:10:36.46  6jA/vB7h0.net
ネタニヤフは最大48時間以内に反撃すると明言 
先程IDFのイランに対する対処計画が政府で承認された

201:名無し三等兵 (ﾜｯﾁｮｲ 6b05-8qIB [240f:33:658e:1:*])
 24/04/15 05:34:22.33  grYFlzx00.net
迎撃なんてデタラメww 
 
米国のミサイルじゃ無理なの。 
 
Study: THAAD’s interception capability may not be reliable 
Posted on : 2015-06-25 18:57 KST Modified on : 2019-10-19 20:29  
/arti/english_edition/e_international/697535.html 
But they also concluded a THAAD unit would have difficulty accurately targeting the Scud-B and Scud-C missiles because of their irregular trajectory, which moves in a spinning or screw-shaped pattern rather than a straight line once it finishes its powered flight and reaches a target. 
 
In the case of a Nodong interception, the same irregular movement issues apply, along with the basic US missile defense problem of being unable to distinguish genuine warheads from decoys. Noting that intercepting missile would have to be fired when the Nodong is at an altitude of over 105 km from its target, Postol and Lewis said the difference from a decoy would be difficult to identity at that height. While a decoy is lighter and would have a slower descent to earth, the thin air at that altitude would produce similar descent speeds, making the warhead and decoy difficult to tell apart. 
 
Postol and Lewis based their analysis on Missile Defense Agency (MDA) figures on THAAD capabilities, previous use of the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) missile in combat, test results for the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), and North Korea’s potential response capabilities.

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