07/01/03 22:10:24 KP1z3GFx0
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███ is the second generation █████ supporting
the anonymous transport of TCP streams over the Internet. Its low latency makes it very suitable
for common tasks, such as Web browsing, but insecure against traffic-analysis attacks by a global
passive adversary. We present new traffic-analysis techniques that allow adversaries with only
a partial view of the network to infer which nodes are being used to relay the anonymous streams
and therefore greatly reduce the anonymity provided by ███. Furthermore, we show
that otherwise unrelated streams can be linked back to the same initiator Our attack is feasible
for the adversary anticipated by the ███ designers. Our theoretical attacks
are backed up by experiments performed on the deployed, albeit experimental, ███
network. Our techniques should also be applicable to any low latency anonymous network.
These attacks highlight the relationship between the field of traffic-analysis and more traditional
computer security issues, such as covert channel analysis. Our research also highlights that
the inability to directly observe network links does not prevent an attacker from performing
traffic-analysis: the adversary can use the anonymising network as an oracle to infer the traffic
load on remote nodes in order to perform traffic-analysis.