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― Excerpts from the annual historical report of the HQ. USFJ (CY 1971), pp. 75-77. ―
SECTION II - HEADQUARTERS, USFJ RELATIONS WITH NON-DOD AGENCIES
* MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION - Air Traffic Control
(U) On 30 July 1971, a catastrophic mid-air collision occurred between an All Nippon Airways Boeing 727
and a Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) F-86 at an altitude of 28,000 feet over northern Japan which
claimed the lives of all 162 persons aboard the 727; the JASDF F-86 pilot parachuted to safety. The immediate
repercussions of this, the worst aviation disaster in history, were immediate and included resignation of the
Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director General Masuhara, the JASDF Chief of Staff General Ueda, the arrest
of the F-86 pilot on charges of manslaughter, the suspension of all Self Defense Force flight training and the
imposition of new Air Traffic Control (ATC) regulations concerning Government of Japan (GOJ) military flying
activities. [16] These measures included (1) that all military testing and training flights would be performed
in designated training airspace separated from airports and airways and (2) Visual Flight Rules (VFR) operations
would not be conducted within controlled airspace or airways. Negotiations were then initiated through the
Civil Aeronautics Subcommittee of the Joint Committee with Japan Civil Aeronautics Board (JCAB) authorities
in order to establish appropriate training airspace that could be used by U.S. military aircraft. On 2 September
1971, a meeting of the Civil Aeronautics Subcommittee was held at the JCAB Headquarters. At this time, U.S.
Forces training airspace requirements were presented to the Japanese side. In order to preclude imposition of
similar ATC restrictions upon U.S. aircraft and until such time as adequate training airspace was made available
to U.S. Forces, a memorandum was submitted to the Joint Committee. In this memorandum, the U.S.
representative made the U.S. position a matter of record, i.e., that no action would be taken by the GOJ that
would affect current flight operations under agreement by, the Joint Committee. [17] On 17 September 1971,
the JCAB established, by Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) C-362, four high-altitude special use training areas
(A, C, G and K) for use by Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) aircraft in addition to special airspace corridors
which would be used by all aircraft transiting these areas. [18] Procedures for U.S. Forces use of these and
future special training areas were agreed to by the Joint Committee on 22 September 1971. These procedures
require that U.S. Forces Japan, through the Fifth Air Force Combat Operations Center (5AF COC), notify the
JASDF of all U.S. Government requirements to use JSDF special use training airspace. [19] Implementing
procedures were then coordinated and established between Fifth Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS)
/Operations and Japan Air Defense Command (JADC) DCS/Operations by an Interservice agreement signed
on 5 October 1971 and which became effective on 15 October 1971. [20] In essence, this agreement specified
that all U.S. Forces units provide 5AF COC with a daily intent message whenever flying activities penetrate
/operate within JSDF training/testing airspace. The message indicates area to be utilized, time and altitude.
Information is compiled by 5AF COC and passed to JADC on a daily basis. In the meantime, the JCAB
established, by NOTAMs C-523 through 530, additional special use training areas B, L, N. P and Q, in addition
to corridors for each airspace.